A Deductive Analysis of Constructivism, Cultural Relativism, and Realism

Henry Whittlesey (Schroeder)

[Abstract on relevance to the perypatetik project:

This paper presents a deductive argument for air (meant literally) to the extent that functional human beings are desired. Within the pragmatic-romantic framework of the perypatetik project, air is associated with romantics, as it underpins values and norms such as the process of living, production, non-materialism, fatalism, balance, freedom and relaxation. The disregard for it and lack of awareness of this among pragmatists is a precondition for the establishment and maintenance of modern-day dissatisfaction, frustration and anger.]

 

In The Nose by Russian/Ukrainian author Nikolai Gogol, the protagonist loses his nose and then his mind. As Effi Briest’s psychological and ultimately physical condition deteriorates in Theodore Fontane’s eponymous novel, she feels suffocated. By contrast, Levin in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina grasps a truth conveyed by the peasant Fyodor after cutting hay with him and other peasants. In these and countless other works, air or the absence of it has dramatic consequences.

1. Introduction

The field of ethics can be broken down into the subfields of normative ethics, metaethics, and applied ethics. In the subfield of metaethics, we encounter three divergent schools of thought that explain the nature of values according to approaches referred to as constructivism, cultural relativism, and realism. The first two are understood to be mind-dependent, i.e., the presence of a human mind is required; by contrast, the third, realism, reflects a mind-independent method. It holds that the criteria for values can be objective (inherently defined): They would exist in the absence of a human mind. Apart from the above commonality shared by constructivism and relativism, each approach offers vindicating and undermining genealogies – to borrow from Sharon Street – in an attempt to answer the questions of the nature of how we ought to act.

In this paper, the three positions in metaethics will be analyzed in more depth on the basis of three texts or excerpts from larger works: First, the constructivist position will be laid out in a recapitulation of the argument in Sharon Street’s paper “Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think so?”; the second theory, relativism, will be considered on the basis of the article titled “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism” by James Rachels; and, third, the fundamental position in Plato’s Euthyphro will be restated to gain a succinct understanding of the realist view. The rehashing of these positions will then be followed by an explanation of the underlying deductive arguments on which realism relies and their ultimate exclusion of the other positions. To close, the paper will return to the ethical relevance of breathing/intaking air in a broader context.

2. Constructivism – in light of Sharon Street’s argument

Do we value honesty because it is an honest thing or is honesty valued because we (humans) have agreed to value it? This dilemma dates back to Plato’s Euthyphro and the question of whether “the pious is loved because it’s pious, not pious because it’s loved” (Plato 14). In her argument implicitly supporting the view that the honest or pious is defined not by the thing itself, but by minds ascribing value to it, Sharon Street defends the constructivist model by arguing that evolution would succeed whether or not humankind held particular moral beliefs (691) and, perhaps more importantly, the mind-dependent basis of something like honesty or piety is crucial to avoid what she calls “global evaluative skepticism” (692). How does she arrive at her conclusions?

The question Street is trying to answer is “whether an evolutionary biological explanation of our values ought to undermine them” (693). In the evolutionary biological explanation (EBE), values are established by the evolutionary process (688), a view that would be tantamount to supporting a mind-independent position because evolutionary forces would have shaped us in such a way as to be reliable at detecting […] truths” (690). Evolution rather than human agreement would have determined the nature of our morality. Street refutes this view by dismissing the notion that causation similar to physical survival can be found in our evaluative tendencies (691): If we fail to notice an independent evaluative truth, we simply won’t live in accordance with it, but it would not hurt reproductive, i.e., evolutionary success (691). Another perhaps even more pressing concern with the mind-independent position, according to Street, is that it would lead to skepticism about any given value (692). If minds have not been involved in the construction of values, then we do not have reliable grounds for what we value. She refers to this conundrum as an undermining genealogy because an examination of the sources of our beliefs about values turns up little to nothing, as if we have been hypnotized into or conjured up our most cherished moral values (691). Alongside the denial of the mind-independent position in the implied deductive argument,[1] Street argues that while there is no vindicating genealogy for the mind-dependent position, the causal origin is not relevant because what is valuable is just whatever we take to be valuable (692).

3. Cultural relativism – on the basis of James Rachels’ critique

In “The Challenges of Cultural Relativism,” James Rachels outlines and criticizes some central tenets of moral relativism. To blend the topic with readers’ everyday experiences, Rachels starts by expressing a seeming paradox in ethics: What is thought right within one group may be utterly abhorrent to the members of another group, and vice-versa (151). This prompts cultural relativists to debunk the idea of universal truth in ethics; there can be no independent standard (152). According to Rachels, six central claims underpin relativism: 1) societies have different moral codes; 2) there is no objective standard that can be used to judge one as better than another; 3) the moral code of our own society has no special status; 4) there is no universal truth in ethics for all; 5) the moral code of a society determines what is right in that society; and finally 6) it is arrogance for us to judge the conduct of others (153). The consequences of this line of argumentation can be aggregated in three statements: 1) we could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own; 2) we could decide whether actions are right or wrong just by consulting the standards of our society; 3) the idea of moral progress is called into doubt (154-5). Rachels proceeds to prove the falsity of these three consequences by proposing three deductive arguments and denying the consequent of each one: If cultural relativism is true… 1) we can’t judge other countries as inferior; … 2) our own culture is always correct … 3) there is no moral progress (Prof. Shepardson – class notes). He denies each consequent, which entails that the antecedent of each conditional (cultural relativism is true) is also false.[2] Rachels further refutes the cultural relativism view by showing that all societies share the values of protecting the young, telling the truth, and prohibition of murder (156-7). Notwithstanding the criticism, cultural relativism, similar to constructivism, rejects the notion that values are mind-independent à la Plato. This position we shall examine in the rest of the paper.

4. Realism – as it originated in Plato

“The pious is loved because it’s pious, not pious because it’s loved,” Socrates implores Euthyphro to definitively agree with him. This agreement sets the stage for the nature of values to be an objective, a priori universal that would continue to exist, similar to Kantian time and space,[3] in the absence of human beings. In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates asks the expert on gods to define or specify the properties of piousness (4e). Euthyphro’s first definition is to use an action (prosecuting those who commit injustice) or lack thereof to this end. Socrates counters by convincing Euthyphro to concede that actions cannot be a definition of a value because there are disputes over actions (6c, 8d, 9c) and, furthermore, a definition or properties needs to cover “the form of piety by which all the pieties are pious” (6e). This leads to the famous discussion about whether what is loved by the gods is pious. While it ends inconclusively in Plato’s dialogue (despite the concession that a value such as the pious is not defined by the gods, i.e., minds), this exchange became the hull for a priori universal ethical values when the course was charted. And in its wake, a foremost concern has been how to determine the nature of moral values without minds.

5. A deductive defense of realism

To establish the plausibility of realism expediently, it is advisable to demonstrate values as mind-independent since this characteristic differentiates realism from both constructivism and relativism. However, prior to the pursuit of this avenue, it is helpful to broaden the scope of values beyond, e.g., piety, honesty…. In the spirit of Sharon Street’s evaluative claims (1-7), especially 1 to 3 as well as 6 and 7,[4] I will include the value of air defined as “immersion in and/or inhaling (through the nose for ten seconds) of oxygen-rich air for humans and the intake of carbon dioxide for plants.”[5]^,[6] Along the lines of Street’s evaluative claims, here with regard to humans, the evaluative claim “the good life is one devoted to inhaling air through your nose for 10 seconds constantly” establishes analogously that this is a moral value. That air (here) and screaming (in Street) are moral values can also be bolstered deductively in this hypothetical syllogism:

If p→q: If morality tells us how we ought to act, morality includes actions taken relative to ourselves as well as others (since some actions only affect the self).

If q→r: If morality includes actions taken relative to the self, then the action of appropriately inhaling oxygen or taking in carbon dioxide, i.e., air, is a moral value.

If p→r: If morality tells us how we ought to act, then the action of appropriately inhaling or taking in air (oxygen or carbon dioxide) is a moral value.

This valid and sound argument is consistent with standard ethical values. If we replace air with honesty, the argument holds.

Now, to deduce the soundness and validity of realism in regards to objectivity, I shall analyze the case of air in this basic deductive argument: If x (e.g., air) is determinant for humans and non-humans, then it will still exist in the absence of a mind. The antecedent is affirmed, i.e., x is determinant for both. Consequently, x will exist in the absence of a mind.[7]

However, if we plug in a perceived human-constructed value such as honesty for x, the consequent of the first premise, in any case at first glance, may be denied: It could be claimed that it is false that honesty will still exist in the absence of a mind. The first argument, therefore, only seems valid and sound with the value air. To clarify the case with a value such as honesty, we must examine this question: Is there a value like honesty in trees, plants…? The following constructive dilemma can be laid out to ascertain the status of plant life. If a tree has much air (here: carbon dioxide), then it grows slowly and steadily for a long time; if a tree has little air, it grows fast and lives less long. It must have much or little air. Therefore, a tree will grow slowly for a long time or quickly for a short time.[8]^,[9] As deduced above, the tree’s future is determined by air (p e-V r): it grows fast or slow. This entails honest action, with either outcome. The Merriam-Webster definition of honesty is adherence to the facts. The tree’s growth trajectory adheres to the facts of its circumstances (more or less air).

The destructive dilemma[10] for the honesty of the tree looks like this: If c→d: If the trajectory of the tree is effectively an honest “decision” determined by the quantity air, i.e., it adheres to the facts, then the tree grows slow or fast. If e→f: If the trajectory of the tree is effectively a dishonest “decision” determined by the quantity air, i.e., it does not adhere to the facts, then the tree dies. c or e: The “decision” is honest or dishonest. The conclusion is d or f: In the honest case, the tree grows slowly or quickly depending on the quantity of air; in the dishonest case, the tree dies. This proves the validity (and soundness) of the original argument in support of realism: If x (e.g., air, honesty) is determinant for humans and non-humans, then it will still exist in the absence of a mind. Furthermore, in the case of negative values (e.g., dishonesty, non-air) plugged into the original argument for objectivity, its validity is retained; albeit the decisive factor (determinant) will be death, collapse, failure…. Accordingly, analogous to what we find in the world, the positive values of air, honesty and, to avoid contradiction, all other ethical values we choose to prefer are mind-independent.[11] The demonstration of values as a priori also rules out the mind-dependent explanation. As such, the position of realism accurately reflects the nature of ethical (as well as other) values, to the exclusion of the mind-dependent approaches of constructivism and relativism.

6. Conclusion

The answer to the question of the nature of good and bad, right and wrong, how we ought to act is not just a matter of intellectual concern divorced from the real world. It is absolutely critical that the nature of positive moral values is defined inherently, so that humankind does not become persuaded by fallacious arguments propagated by parties with interests not in line with functional human beings, as once happened in the greatest human travesty in the history of humankind (the Holocaust/Shoah). At the peak of this spectrum of universal a priori values must be readily apparent objective ones like air. Below those come other sets including the conventional, more human-tied values such as honesty, courage, piety, justice, etc. The praise-worthy agenda of constructivists and relativists to empower humankind as a thinking agent determining codes must be applied to the level of actions and judging actions relative to inherently defined values (as Euthyphro initially does in his attempts to define the pious (5b)). Throughout the world, we face a catastrophic situation in which humankind has come to ignore the value of air and engages in massive discrimination against those whose (slow and steady) future is shaped by the determinant of large quantities of air. Odd and counterintuitive as it may sound, our value system has been distorted to disregard or even negate the importance of air, perhaps in part because we deny the realist approach. Minds have come together to determine and support this distortion, as historically they have agreed on other distortions for nefarious agendas. This contemporary mistake causes the blank looks on students faces, the inability to interact with fellow human beings in a functional manner, makes learning and executing more difficult, spreads illness and causes frustration (especially in midlife and beyond). There is a reason why the theme of air has figured so prominently in major works of art. These authors, everyday philosophers for the people, knew or intuited that air is critical to a thriving human being and the lack of it drives one to insanity. Those immersed in air, like the peasants with whom Levin works in Anna Karenina, are able to impart wisdom and ultimately reorient the lost aristocrat. Effi Briest is ensconced in and aware of air as she begins her affair with Crampas on horseback rides along the coast, while noticing the lack of it at home with Innstetten and later as she is dying. Yet no author said it more directly than Nikolai Gogol in The Nose: the protagonist loses his nose and then – without oxygen reaching his brain – his mind. We are currently in the process of that. Globally. And, perversely, those aware of it, for the most part subconsciously, are actually discriminated against.

 

Works cited

1. Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Online. Accessed September 25, 2023.
2. Rachels, James. “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism.” Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. Ed. George Sher. New York and London: Routledge, 2012.
3. Reeve, C.D.C. (Ed.), A Plato Reader. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2012.
4. Salmon, Merrilee. Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking. 6^th United States: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013.
5. Street, Sharon. “Does Anything Really Matter or Did We just Evolve to Think So?” [Remaining information not available]

[1] If we are reasonably reliable about values, then either the mind-independent (evolutionary biology) explanation or the mind-dependent explanation is true. The antecedent is affirmed in propositions 1-5 and remarks made in this context (see p. 688), so the deductive argument is:

If p, then q

p

q

This conclusion (q), which consists of two choices, is then subject to analysis in a disjunctive syllogism, with one disjunct (mind-independent) denied, i.e.:

Either the mind-independent or mind-dependent explanation explains our reliable values, i.e.,

r or s

not r

s

[2] If p, then q

not q

not p

[3] Time and space in Kant cannot be objectively found in the physical world and thus are intellectual, subjective, mind-dependent… concepts, but they would surely still be present in the absence of humans, i.e., the absence of intellects or minds (time would still pass [e.g., trees would get older]; there would still be space between two trees, etc.)

[4] For example, “the good life is one devoted to screaming constantly” (688).

[5] Technically speaking, oxygen and carbon dioxide are gases. The choice of term does not have any effect on the argument.

[6] In the event that it is unclear, as is generally the case based on the author’s experience, breathing as defined in this way is a choice. Fundamentally, it is not conceived of this way. If you simply run the experiment on yourself and inhale through your nose for 10 second, exhale through your nose for 10 seconds and keep doing this, you will almost certainly ascertain that you do not breathe this way. By contrast, all of us are familiar with moments of being “out of breath” or “short of breath” – these are related states. A full spectrum of possibilities (two seconds, four seconds…) also exists. The point is that this is a choice and something that shifts (usually as a result of other circumstances).

[7] If p→q

p

q

[8] If p→q

If r→s

p V r

q V s

[9] To preclude the accusation of a false dilemma, it should be noted that the disjunction can be extended in either direction to the point of no air, at which the tree dies, as we will see below.

[10] According Salmon, this case is a destructive dilemma. See p. 321.

[11] According to the Aristotelian and Boolean Box of Contradiction, the following two statements cannot both be true: i) all s are p, and ii) some s are not p. If we insert individual types (of ethical values) for s and ethical values for p, then whether s is air or honesty or courage or piety makes them p, i.e., ethical values. In turn, this entails that it is false to claim that some types of ethical values (s) are not ethical values (p). As such, the value air cannot be mind-independent, while simultaneously the values honesty, piety, etc. are a product of minds.